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Abstract
This paper examines two-sided matching with budget con-
straints where one side (a firm or hospital) can make mone-
tary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor).
In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched
to a single hospital, a hospital has a maximum quota; thus,
the number of doctors assigned to a hospital cannot exceed a
certain limit. In our model, in contrast, a hospital has a fixed
budget; that is, the total amount of wages allocated by each
hospital to doctors is constrained. With budget constraints,
stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the exis-
tence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence, we extend the
“matching with contracts” model of Hatfield and Milgrom
so that it deals with approximately stable matchings where
each of the hospitals’ utilities after deviation can increase by
a factor up to a certain amount. We then propose two novel
mechanisms that efficiently return a stable matching that ex-
actly satisfies the budget constraints. Specifically, by sacrific-
ing strategy-proofness, our first mechanism achieves the best
possible bound. We also explore a special case on which a
simple mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors, while main-
taining the best possible bound of the general case.
Introduction
This paper studies a two-sided, one-to-many matching
model when there are budget constraints on one side (a
firm or hospital), that is, the total amount of wages that
it can pay to the other side (a worker or doctor) is lim-
ited. The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively
developed, as illustrated by the comprehensive surveys of
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) or Manlove (2013). Rather than
fixed budgets, maximum quotas limiting the total number of
doctors that each hospital can hire are typically used.
Some real-world examples are subject to matching with
such budget constraints: a college can offer stipends to re-
cruit better students when the budget for admission is lim-
ited; a firm can offer wages to workers under the condition
that employment costs depend on earnings in the previous
accounting period; a public hospital can offer salaries to doc-
tors when the total amount relies on funds from the govern-
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ment; and so on. To establish our model and concepts, we
use doctor-hospital matching as a running example.
To date, most papers on matching with monetary
transfers assume that budgets are unrestricted, e.g.,
Kelso and Crawford (1982). When they are restricted, sta-
ble matchings may fail to exist (Mongell and Roth 1986;
Abizada 2016). There are several other possibilities to
circumvent the nonexistence problem. Abizada (2016)
modifies the notion of stability in a different way and
proposes a variant of the Deferred Acceptance (DA)
mechanism that produces a pairwise, instead of coali-
tional, stable matching and is strategy-proof for doctors.
Dean, Goemans, and Immorlica (2006) assume that hospi-
tals’ priorities are lexicographic to ensure the existence of
a stable matching. We instead allow each hospital to have
an additive utility, but the existence is not guaranteed yet.
Kawase and Iwasaki (2017) focus on near-feasible match-
ings that exceed each budget of the hospitals by a certain
amount. Their mechanisms find a “nearby” instance with a
stable matching for each instance of a matching problem.
This paper focuses on approximately stable matchings
where the participants are willing to change the assign-
ments only for a multiplicative improvement of a certain
amount (Arkin et al. 2009). This idea can be interpreted as
one in which a hospital in a blocking pair changes his match
as soon as his utility after the change increases by any (ar-
bitrarily small) amount. Arkin et al. (2009) examine a sta-
ble roommate problem, which is a non-bipartite one-to-one
matching problem, while we examine a bipartite one-to-
many matching problem. It is reasonable for a hospital to
change his assignment only in favor of a significant improve-
ment (the grass may be greener on the other side, but it takes
effort to cross the fence).
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that these
studies, except the works of Abizada (2016) and
Kawase and Iwasaki (2017), discuss no strategic issue,
that is, misreporting a doctor’s preference may be profitable.
The literature on matching has found strategy-proofness
for doctors, i.e., no doctor has an incentive to misreport
her preference, to be a key property in a wide variety of
settings (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003).
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, we mod-
ify the generalized DA algorithm and devise a new property,
which we call α-approximation, on the matching with con-
Table 1: Summary of the Results: UB and LB stand for upper and
lower bounds, respectively. Let s be the maximum frac-
tion of a wage to budget among the given contracts and
|D| be the number of doctors.
(a) Non-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: Thm. 2 holds if s > 1/2.
Hosp. Utils. Approximation Ratio
Additive UB: 11−s (Alg. 2 and Thm. 4)
(incl. Proportional) LB: 11−s (Thm. 2)
Proportional
UB: 1.62 (Alg. 4 and Thm. 7)
LB: 1.62 (Thm. 6)
(b) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms.
Hosp. Utils. Approximation Ratio
Additive UB: ⌈ 1+ln(|D|−1)1−s ⌉ (Alg. 3 and Thm. 5)
(incl. Proportional) LB: open
Proportional
UB: 11−s (Alg. 5 and Thm. 8)
LB: open
tract framework (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005). This is be-
cause the existing class of mechanisms and properties are
not sufficient to characterize a choice function that produces
such an approximately stable matching. Second, we propose
two novel mechanisms that efficiently return a stable match-
ing that exactly satisfies the budget constraints. Specifically,
by sacrificing strategy-proofness, the best possible bound is
achieved. We further examine a special case in which each
hospital has a utility that is proportional to the size of each
contract. We establish two mechanisms that achieve better
approximation ratios and, Notably, by sacrificing strategy-
proofness, the ratio is bounded by a constant. Table 1 sum-
marizes the results on approximation ratios.
Let us finally note that there is a certain amount
of recent studies on two-sided matchings in the AI
community, although this literature has been established
mainly in the field across algorithms and economics.
Drummond and Boutilier (2013; 2014) examine preference
elicitation procedures for two-sided matching. In the context
of mechanism design, Hosseini, Larson, and Cohen (2015)
consider a mechanism for a situation where agents’ pref-
erences dynamically change. Kurata et al. (2017) deal
with strategy-proof mechanisms for affirmative action
in school choice programs (diversity constraints), while
Goto et al. (2016) handle regional constraints, e.g., regional
minimum/maximum quotas are imposed on hospitals in ur-
ban areas so that more doctors are allocated to rural areas.
Model
This section describes a model for two-sided matchings with
budget constraints. A market is a tuple (D,H,X,≻D, u, s)
where each component is defined as follows: There is a finite
set of doctorsD = {d1, . . . , dn} and a finite set of hospitals
H = {h1, . . . , hm}. Let X denote a finite set of contracts
where each contract x ∈ X is associated with a doctor xD ∈
D and a hospital xH ∈ H . Let s : X → R+ be the size
function, whereR+ is the set of nonnegative real numbers. A
contract x means that hospital xH offers s(x) fraction of its
budget as a wage to doctor xD . For any subset of contracts
X ′ ⊆ X , let X ′d denote {x ∈ X
′ : xD = d} and X ′h
denote {x ∈ X ′ : xH = h}. For notational simplicity, let
s(X ′) =
∑
x∈X′ s(x) forX
′ ⊆ X .
Let≻D= (≻d)d∈D denote the doctors’ preference profile
where≻d is the strict relation of d ∈ D overXd ∪ {∅}; that
is, x ≻d x′ means that d strictly prefers x to x′. ∅ indicates
a null contract. Let u : X → R+ be the utility function. We
assume that the utility of each hospital is additive; that is, for
any two sets of contracts X ′, X ′′ ⊆ Xh, hospital h prefers
X ′ toX ′′ if and only if
∑
x∈X′ u(x) >
∑
x∈X′′ u(x) holds.
In what follows, we denote
∑
x∈X′
h
u(x) by u(X ′h) for sim-
plicity.
We call a subset of contracts X ′ ⊆ X a matching if
|X ′d| ≤ 1 for all d ∈ D and s(X
′
h) ≤ 1 for all h ∈ H .
Given a matching X ′, another matching X ′′ ⊆ Xh for a
hospital h is an α-blocking coalition if
1. x ≻xD x
′ for any x ∈ X ′′ \X ′ and x′ ∈ X ′xD , and
2. u(X ′′) > α · u(X ′h).
We then obtain a stability concept.
Definition 1 (α-stability (Arkin et al. 2009)). We say a
matching X ′ is α-stable if there exists no α-blocking coali-
tion.
As we can see, 1-stability is equivalent to the standard sta-
bility concept. Intuitively, the hospitals are willing to change
the assignments only for a multiplicative improvement of α.
This idea regards the value of α as a switching cost for the
hospitals. Note that we can also define the second condi-
tion in an additive manner, i.e., u(X ′′) > u(X ′h) + α. How-
ever, since this does not satisfy scale invariance, the value
of α is not well bounded. In fact, when a market has no α-
stable matching in the additive sense, a market with the hos-
pitals’ utilities that are multiplied by 100 has no 100α-stable
matching.
A mechanism is a function that takes a profile of doc-
tors’ preferences as input and returns a matching X ′. We
say a mechanism is α-stable if it always produces an α-
stable matching for certain α. We also say a mechanism is
strategy-proof for doctors if no doctor ever has any incen-
tive to misreport her preference, regardless of what the other
doctors report.
To design and analyze a mechanism, we
modify the matching with contract frame-
work (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) for our approximate
stability concept. It uses choice functions ChD : 2
X → 2X
and ChH : 2
X → 2X . For each doctor d, its choice
Chd(X
′
d) is {x} such that x is the most preferred contract
within X ′d. We assume Chd(X
′
d) = ∅ if ∅ ≻d x for all
x ∈ X ′d. Then, the choice function of all doctors ChD(X
′)
is given as
⋃
d∈D Chd(X
′
d).
Similarly, the choice of all hospitals ChH(X
′) is⋃
h∈H Chh(X
′
h), where Chh(X
′
h) is a subset of X
′
h. There
are alternative ways to define the choice function of each
hospital Chh. As we discuss later, the mechanisms consid-
ered in this paper can be expressed by the generalized DA
with different formulations of ChH .
In particular, we construct it from a class of sequential
choice functions that receives a sequence of contracts.
Definition 2. Let Xh = {x1, . . . , xn} and Sn be the sym-
metric group of degree n. A sequential choice function on
Xh is a function Chh over a sequence of distinct contracts
inXh such that
Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)) ⊆ {xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)} (1)
for all σ ∈ Sn and 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
and
{xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)} \ Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k))
⊆ {xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k+1)} \ Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k+1))
(2)
for all σ ∈ Sn and 0 ≤ k < n.
Here (1) signifies that the choicemust be taken from avail-
able contracts and (2) signifies that, if a contract x is rejected
at some point, then it is also rejected ever after.
This framework characterizes a class of mechanisms
called the generalized DA mechanism. If a mechanism—
specifically, the choice function of every hospital—satisfies
three properties, substitutability, irrelevance of rejected
contracts, and law of aggregate demand, then it always
finds a “stable” allocation and is strategy-proof for doc-
tors (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005). This result is preserved
because a sequential choice function can induce a (standard)
choice function if it is order-invariant.
Definition 3 (Order-invariance). A sequential choice func-
tion Chh onXh = {x1, . . . , xn} is order-invariant if
Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)) = Chh(xτ(1), . . . , xτ(k))
holds for any σ, τ ∈ Sn and 0 ≤ k ≤ n such that
{xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)} = {xτ(1), . . . , xτ(k)}.
Thus, if a sequential choice function is order-invariant,
the induced choice function satisfies substitutability. The in-
duced choice function satisfies law of aggregate demand if
it further satisfies size-monotonicity.1
Definition 4 (Size-monotonicity). A sequential choice func-
tion Chh onXh = {x1, . . . , xn} is size-monotone if
|Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(i))| ≤ |Chh(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(j))|
holds for any σ ∈ Sn and 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Here, strategy-proofness is still characterized by order-
invariance and size-monotonicity because hospital choice
does not affect doctor preferences. However, even if a se-
quential choice function for each hospital is order-invariant,
the mechanism employed with the function does not always
find a stable matching because such a matching may not ex-
ist in the presence of budget constraints.
Finally, for Lemma 2, let us briefly explain a matroid,
which is a set system (X,F) with the following proper-
ties: (i) ∅ ∈ F ; (ii) F ⊆ G ∈ F implies F ∈ F ; and (iii)
F,G ∈ F , |F | < |G| implies the existence of x ∈ G \ F
such that F ∪{x} ∈ F . Notice that a subset F ofX is called
an independent set if F belongs to F .
1If a choice function satisfies substitutability and law of aggre-
gate demand simultaneously, it also satisfies irrelevance of rejected
contracts (Aizerman and Malishevski 1981).
Negative Results
The nonexistence of stable matchings raises the issue
of the complexity of deciding the existence of a (1-
)stable matching. McDermid and Manlove (2010) consid-
ered a special case of our model and proved NP-hardness.
Hamada et al. (2017) examined a similar model to ours and
proved that the existence problem is ΣP2 -complete. With ap-
proximately stable matchings in Definition 1, we provide the
following hardness result.
Theorem 1. For any constant α > 1, distinguishing
whether a given market has a 1-stable matching or has no
α-stable matching is NP-complete.
We prove the NP-completeness by reducing from the sub-
set sum problem (Garey and Johnson 1979), though details
are omitted due to space limitations.
Furthermore, to obtain an approximately stable matching,
the amount of approximation does not fall 11−s , where s in-
dicates the largest wage size among the given contracts, i.e.,
s = maxx∈X s(x).
Theorem 2. For any positive reals 1/2 < s < 1 and ǫ,
there exists a market such that s(x) ≤ s for all x and no(
1
1−s − ǫ
)
-stable matching exists.
We provide the instance below to prove this theorem due
to the space limitation (Please see the full version for addi-
tional details).
Proof. Let δ be a sufficiently small positive real and α =
1/(1 − s). Let n = ⌊1/δ3⌋, m = ⌈1/s⌉, and l = ⌊(1 −
s)/δ⌋+ 1.
Consider a market with n+ 1 doctors and n− l + 1 hos-
pitals: D = {d∗, d1, . . . , dn} and H = {h∗, hl+1, . . . , hn}.
The set of contractsX is given as
{x∗, x1, . . . , xn} ∪
{
yi,j :
i = 1, . . . , n,
j = max{i, l+ 1}, . . . , n
}
,
where
x∗D = d
∗, x∗H = h
∗, u(x) = s, s(x) = s,
xiD = di, x
i
H = h
∗, u(xi) = i · δ3, s(xi) = δ (i = 1, . . . , n), and
yi,jD = di, y
i,j
H = hj , u(y
i,j) = α−i, s(yi,j) = s (i=1,...,n,j=max{i,l+1},...,n).
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
≻d0 : x
∗,
≻di : x
i ≻di y
i,l+1 ≻di · · · ≻di y
i,n (i = 1, . . . , l), and
≻di : y
i,i ≻di x
i ≻di y
i,i+1 ≻di · · · ≻di y
i,n (i = l + 1, . . . , n).
Then, we claim that there exists no (α− ǫ)-stable matching
in the market instance.
Note that we have no non-trivial lower bound of the ap-
proximation ratio when s ≤ 1/2.
Framework for Approximate Stability
This section introduces a new property, which we call α-
approximation, and modifies the matching with contract
framework (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005). Let A(Xh) be the
set of sequences of distinct contracts in Xh. A sequential
choice function Chh is called α-approximate if Chh always
chooses a feasible subset of given contracts with utility at
least 1/α times the optimal one.
Definition 5 (α-approximation). Given α ≥ 1, for a hos-
pital h ∈ H , a sequential choice function Chh on Xh is
α-approximate if s(Chh(x)) ≤ 1 and
α · u(Chh(x)) ≥ max

u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
|X˜d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D),
X˜ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}

 (3)
holds for any x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh) such that
|Chh(x)d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D).
We note that a sequential choice function can be viewed as
an online algorithm for a removable knapsack problem and
an α-competitive online algorithm (Komm 2016) implies an
α-approximate sequential choice function.
Let us next introduce a modified version of the gen-
eralized DA mechanism, which is formally given as Al-
gorithm 1. This mechanism uses choice functions for the
doctors (Chd)d∈D and sequential choice functions for the
hospitals (Chh)h∈H . Initially, each doctor is set to be un-
matched. Then, an unmatched doctor d proposes to her most
preferred contract x that has not been rejected and the pro-
posed hospital xH chooses a set of contracts ChxH (a
xH ),
where axH is the sequence of proposed contracts for hos-
pital xH . The proposal procedure continues as long as an
unmatched doctor has a non-rejected acceptable contract.
Algorithm 1: Generalized DA
input: X, (Chd)d∈D, (Chh)h∈H output: matching
1 X ′ ← ∅, R← ∅, I ← D;
2 a
h ← () for all h ∈ H ;
3 while I 6= ∅ do
4 pick d ∈ I arbitrarily;
5 let {x} = Chd(Xd \Rd);
6 append x to the end of axH ;
7 X ′ ← ChxH (a
xH ) ∪
⋃
h∈H\{xH}X
′
h;
8 R← R ∪ {x};
9 I ← {d ∈ D : X ′d = ∅ and Chd(Xd \Rd) 6= ∅};
10 returnX ′;
We next prove that α-approximate choice functions lead
to approximately stable matchings. Note that although the
output of the generalized DA depends on which doctor is
selected in line 4, Theorem 3 holds regardless of the output
of the mechanism.
Theorem 3. If the sequential choice function Chh is α-
approximate for every hospital h ∈ H , then the generalized
DA produces an α-stable matchingX ′ ⊆ X .
Proof. Let ah = (xh1 , . . . , x
h
ih
) for each h ∈ H . Note that
X ′ is a matching and X ′h = Chh(a
h) = Chh(x
h
1 , . . . , x
h
n)
by the definition of the algorithm.
We prove that X ′ is α-stable by contradiction. Suppose
that X ′′ ⊆ Xh is an α-blocking coalition for X ′. Then,
X ′′ ⊆ {xh1 , . . . , x
h
ih
} since x ≻xD x
′ holds for any x ∈
X ′′ \X ′ and x′ ∈ X ′xD . Thus, we have
u(X ′′) > α · u(X ′h) = α · u(Chh(a
h))
≥ max

u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
|X˜d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D),
X˜ ⊆ {xh1 , . . . , x
h
ih
}

 ≥ u(X ′′),
which is a contradiction. Here, the first inequality holds
sinceX ′′ is an α-blocking coalition and the second inequal-
ity holds since Chh is α-approximate and |Chh(ah)d| ≤
1 (∀d ∈ D).
It must be emphasized that this framework can be applied
to other types of constraints, e.g., matroid intersection
constraints. The typical example is diversity constraints
in school choice programs where a school is required to
balance the composition of students, typically in terms of
socioeconomic status (Kurata et al. 2017). The framework
also works even when each hospital has a submodular
utility. Designing such mechanisms is our immediate
future work and it will be achieved with online algorithms
for the corresponding problems (Ashwinkumar 2011;
Han et al. 2014; Chakrabarti and Kale 2015;
Buchbinder, Feldman, and Schwartz 2015; Han et al. 2017;
Chan et al. 2017).
Approximately Stable Mechanisms
In matching with constraints (Kamada and Kojima 2015;
Goto et al. 2016; Kurata et al. 2017), designing a desirable
mechanism essentially tailors the choice functions for hos-
pitals to satisfy the necessary properties and constraints si-
multaneously. The design task is difficult because the given
sequences of contracts for hospitals depend on the (sequen-
tial) choice functions themselves and, hence, they are un-
predictable. We tackle this challenging task as an analogue
to online algorithms for knapsack problems.
Non-Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes an approximately stable mecha-
nism that achieves the best possible stability bound, but is
not strategy-proof for doctors. The sequential choice func-
tions greedily choose contracts according to decreasing or-
der of utility per size (i.e., utility per wage). Formally, let us
consider the functions defined in Algorithm 2.2 Note that we
can compute the choice in O(k log k) time.
Algorithm 2:
input: (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh) output: Chh(x1, . . . , xk)
1 if k = 0 then return ∅;
2 let Y ← Chh(x1, . . . , xk−1) ∪ {xk};
3 while s(Y ) > 1 do
4 Y ← Y \ {a} where a ∈ argmin
{u(x)
s(x) : x ∈ Y
}
;
5 return Y ;
Let us next illustrate this mechanism via an example.
2When ties occur in the argmin, we break these ties by choosing
the one with the smallest index.
Example 1. Consider a market with four doctors D =
{d1, d2, d3, d4} and two hospitals H = {h1, h2}. The set
of offered contracts X is {xi,j : i = 1, . . . , 4, j = 1, 2},
where xi,jD = di, x
i,j
H = hj (i = 1, . . . , 4, j = 1, 2). We
assume that xi,1 ≻di x
i,2 for i = 1, 2, 3 and x4,2 ≻d4 x
4,1.
The contracts’ utilities and sizes are provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Utilities and Sizes of the Contracts.
xi,1 ∈ Xh1 x
i,2 ∈ Xh2
u s u/s u s u/s
x1,j ∈ Xd1 111 0.57 194.7 30 0.56 53.6
x2,j ∈ Xd2 98 0.50 196.0 40 0.55 72.7
x3,j ∈ Xd3 83 0.42 197.6 10 0.60 16.7
x4,j ∈ Xd4 110 0.55 200.0 20 0.45 44.4
Initially, we set X ′ = R = ∅, I = {d1, . . . , d4}, and
a
hi = () (i = 1, 2).
Suppose that we select d1 ∈ I at the beginning of the
first iteration. Then, d1 chooses her most preferred contract
x1,1 and we have ah1 = (x1,1), ah2 = (), X ′ = {x1,1},
R = {x1,1}, I = {d2, d3, d4} at the end of the first iteration.
Suppose that we pick d2 ∈ I at the beginning of the sec-
ond iteration. Then, d2 chooses her most preferred contract
x2,1. As h1 cannot keep x
1,1 and x2,1 together, it accepts
x2,1 and rejects x1,1. Thus, we have ah1 = (x1,1, x2,1),
a
h2 = (), X ′ = {x2,1}, R = {x1,1, x2,1}, I = {d1, d3, d4}
at the end of the second iteration.
Similarly, suppose that we choose a doctor with the small-
est index in I at the beginning of each iteration. Our algo-
rithm then works as in Table 3.
Table 3: Our Algorithm’s Procedure.
iter. X ′ I ah1 ah2
0 ∅ {d1, d2, d3, d4} () ()
1 {x1,1} {d2, d3, d4} (x1,1) ()
2 {x2,1} {d1, d3, d4} (x1,1, x2,1) ()
3 {x1,2, x2,1} {d3, d4} (x1,1, x2,1) (x1,2)
4 {x1,2, x2,1, x3,1} {d4} (x1,1, x2,1, x3,1) (x1,2)
5 {x1,2, x2,1, x3,1} {d4} (x1,1, x2,1, x3,1) (x1,2, x4,2)
6 {x1,2, x3,1, x4,1} {d2} (x1,1, x2,1, x3,1, x4,1) (x1,2, x4,2)
7 {x2,2, x3,1, x4,1} ∅ (x1,1, x2,1, x3,1, x4,1) (x1,2, x4,2, x2,2)
To conclude, our algorithm returns the matching X ′ =
{x2,2, x3,1, x4,1}. AlthoughX ′′ = {x1,1, x3,1} is a blocking
coalition,X ′ is almost stable.
We argue that the sequential choice functionChh satisfies
the following property:
Lemma 1. The sequential choice function Chh defined in
Algorithm 2 is 11−s -approximate.
Proof. Let us consider a sequence of distinct con-
tracts (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh). Note that Chh satis-
fies the conditions (1) and (2) since Chh(x1, . . . , xk) ⊆
Chh(x1, . . . , xk−1)∪{xk}. If
∑k
i=1 s(xi) ≤ 1, then the se-
quential choice function returns all the contracts and there-
fore satisfies (3). Thus, we assume that
∑k
i=1 s(xi) > 1.
Let σ ∈ Sk be a permutation such that
u(xσ(1))/s(xσ(1)) ≥ · · · ≥ u(xσ(k))/s(xσ(k)).
Let ℓ be the largest index such that
∑ℓ
i=1 s(xσ(i)) ≤ 1. Note
that
∑ℓ+1
i=1 s(xσ(i)) > 1. Then, by a simple induction, we
can see that {xσ(1), . . . , xσ(ℓ)} ⊆ Chh(x1, . . . , xk). There-
fore, we obtain u(Chh(x1, . . . , xk)) is at least
ℓ∑
i=1
u(xσ(i)) ≥
∑ℓ
i=1 s(xσ(i))∑ℓ+1
i=1 s(xσ(i))
(
ℓ+1∑
i=1
u(xσ(i))
)
=
(
1−
s(xσ(ℓ+1))∑ℓ+1
i=1 s(xσ(i))
)(
ℓ+1∑
i=1
u(xσ(i))
)
≥ (1 − s)
(
ℓ+1∑
i=1
u(xσ(i))
)
≥ (1 − s) ·max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
X˜ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}
}
.
Here, the first inequality holds since
∑j
i=1 u(xσ(i))∑j
i=1 s(xσ(i))
is mono-
tone nonincreasing for j and the second inequality holds by∑ℓ+1
i=1 s(xσ(i)) > 1 and s(xσ(ℓ+1)) ≤ s. Thus, it is
1
1−s -
approximate.
Now, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4. For any market, the generalized DA mechanism
with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 2 produces
a 11−s -stable matching. In addition, the mechanism can be
implemented to run in O(|X | log |X |) time.
This mechanism is not strategy-proof for doctors (See
Proposition 1 in the full version).
Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes another stable mechanism that
does not achieve the best possible stability bound, but is
strategy-proof for doctors. Let us consider a set system
(Xh,Fh), where
Fh =
{
X ′ ⊆ Xh :
∣∣∣{x ∈ X ′ : s(x) > 1tγ}
∣∣∣ ≤ t
(t = 1, . . . , |D|)
}
and γ =
⌈
1+ln(|D|−1)
1−s
⌉
. We can easily check that the set
system (Xh,Fh) is a transversal matroid for each h ∈
H (Oxley 1992). In addition, we have s(X ′) ≤ 1 ifX ′ ∈ Fh
and |X ′d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D) because
s(X ′) ≤ s+
|D|−1∑
t=1
1
tγ
≤ s+
1
γ
·
(
1 +
∫ |D|−1
1
dx
x
)
≤ s+
1 + ln(|D| − 1)
γ
≤ 1.
The second sequential choice function Chh chooses the
maximumutility independent set by a greedy algorithm. The
formal definition is given in Algorithm 3.
We claim that the choice function satisfies the following
property.
Algorithm 3:
input: (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh) output: Chh(x1, . . . , xk)
1 if k = 0 then return ∅;
2 let Y ← Chh(x1, . . . , xk−1) ∪ {xk};
3 if Y 6∈ Fh then
4 let a ∈ argmin{u(x) : x ∈ Y, Y \ {x} ∈ Fh};
5 Y ← Y \ {a};
6 return Y ;
Lemma 2. For each hospital h, the sequential choice func-
tion Chh defined in Algorithm 3 is γ (=
⌈
1+ln(|D|−1)
1−s
⌉
)-
approximate.
Proof. Let (x1, . . . , xk) be the input of the choice function.
We prove that, for anyX∗ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk},
γ · u(Chh(x1, . . . , xk)) ≥ u(X
∗)
holds when s(X∗) ≤ 1 and |X∗d | ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D). Let
us consider a set of contracts X∗ = {y1, . . . , yℓ} where
s(y1) ≥ · · · ≥ s(yℓ). Then, we have s(yi) ≤ 1/i for
i = 1, . . . , ℓ because 1 ≥ s(y1)+· · ·+s(yi) ≥ i·s(yi). Thus,
we can partition X∗ into γ sets X1, . . . , Xγ that satisfy
X i ∈ Fh for all i = 1, . . . , γ. Indeed, we can obtain the par-
tition by setting X i = {yi, yγ+i, y2γ+i, . . . , y⌊(ℓ−i)/γ⌋γ+i}.
As u(Chh(x1, . . . , xk)) ≥ u(X i), we obtain
γ · u(Chh(x1, . . . , xk)) ≥
γ∑
i=1
u(X i) = u(X∗),
which proves the theorem.
Lemma 3. For each hospital h, the sequential choice func-
tion Chh defined in Algorithm 3 satisfies order-invariance
and size-monotonicity.
Proof. The choice function is clearly order-invariant, since
the greedy algorithm formatroids, which finds the maximum
utility independent set, is not affected by the input sequence
order (Babaioff, Hartline, and Kleinberg 2009). Moreover,
as |Chh(x1, . . . , xk)| is the rank of {x1, . . . , xk} in the ma-
troid Fh, the choice function is size-monotone.
Now, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 5. For any market, the generalized DA mecha-
nism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 3 is
strategy-proof for doctors and produces a
⌈
1+ln(|D|−1)
1−s
⌉
-
stable matching. In addition, the mechanism can be imple-
mented to run in O(|X |2) time.
Proportional Utilities
This section examines a special case in which each hospital
has a utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to its
size. Formally, for every h ∈ H and x ∈ Xh, u(x) = βh ·
s(x) holds where βh (> 0) is a constant that only depends
on the hospital.We call such a market a proportional market.
W.l.o.g., we may assume that βh = 1 for all h ∈ H .
To admit an approximately stable matching, the amount
of approximation improves to a constant. We first provide
an intractability result.
Theorem 6. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a proportional mar-
ket with no
(
1+
√
5
2 − ǫ
)
-stable matching.
Proof. Let φ = 1+
√
5
2 . Consider a market with three doctors
D = {d1, d2, d3} and two hospitals H = {h1, h2}. The set
of contracts is X = {x, y, yˆ, z, zˆ}, where
xD = d1, xH = h1, s(x) = 1/φ+ ǫ/2,
yD = d2, yH = h1, s(y) = (1/φ)
2,
yˆD = d2, yˆH = h2, s(yˆ) = 1,
zD = d3, zH = h1, s(z) = 1/φ, and
zˆD = d3, zˆH = h2, s(zˆ) = ǫ.
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
≻d1 : x, ≻d2 : y ≻d2 yˆ, ≻d3 : zˆ ≻d3 z.
If X ′ = {x, yˆ}, then X ′′ = {y, z} is a (φ − ǫ)-blocking
coalition for h1 since
1/φ+(1/φ)2
1/φ+ǫ/2 =
φ
1+ǫφ/2 < φ − ǫ. Simi-
larly, we can easily check that there exists a (φ−ǫ)-blocking
coalition for any matching and hence this market has no
(φ− ǫ)-stable matching.
However, distinguishing whether a given proportional
market has
(
1+
√
5
2 − ǫ
)
-stable matching or not is NP-hard
(See Theorem 9 in the full version).
Non-Strategy-Proof 1.62-Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes a 1+
√
5
2 (≈ 1.62)-stable mecha-
nism. We denote the golden ratio by φ (= 1+
√
5
2 ). Note that
φ + 1 = φ2 holds. To obtain the mechanism, we apply an
online algorithm provided by Iwama and Taketomi (2002)
for the (proportional case) removable knapsack problem as
a sequential choice function. Let us divide the set of con-
tracts into three classes—small, medium, and large. These
are defined as
S = {x ∈ X : s(x) ≤ 1− 1/φ},
M = {x ∈ X : 1− 1/φ < s(x) < 1/φ}, and
L = {x ∈ X : s(x) ≥ 1/φ}.
It should be noted that, if the algorithm chooses a set of
contracts with a total size of at least 1/φ, then it is φ-
approximate since
φ · u(Chh(x)) ≥ 1 ≥ max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
X˜ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}
}
for any x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh).
Thus, if some large contracts have been given, then it
is sufficient to select one of them. Also, if it can choose
two medium contracts together, then it is sufficient to se-
lect both because 2(1− 1/φ) > 1/φ. If a given sequence of
contracts contains medium contracts, but it cannot choose
two medium contracts together and no large contract ex-
ists, the algorithm keeps the smallest medium contract.
Algorithm 4:
input: (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh) output: Chh(x1, . . . , xk)
1 Initialize S,M , L;
2 if k = 0 then return ∅;
3 let Y ← Chh(x1, . . . , xk−1);
4 if s(Y ) ≥ 1/φ then return Y ;
5 else if xk ∈ L then return {xk};
6 else
7 Y ← Y ∪ {xk};
8 if s(Y ∩M) > 1 then
9 Y ← Y \ {a} where a ∈ argmaxx∈Y ∩M s(x);
10 while s(Y ) > 1 do
11 Y ← Y \ {a} where a ∈ argminx∈Y ∩S s(x);
12 return Y ;
The formal definition of the algorithm is given in Algo-
rithm 4. Note that the functionChh satisfies (1) and (2) since
Chh(x1, . . . , xk) ⊆ Chh(x1, . . . , xk−1) ∪ {xk}.
We obtain the next lemma through the techniques of
Iwama and Taketomi (2002).
Lemma 4. The sequential choice function defined in Algo-
rithm 4 is φ-approximate.
Now, with Theorem 3, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 7. For any proportional market, the generalized
DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algo-
rithm 4 produces a φ-stable matching. In addition, the mech-
anism can be implemented to run in O(|X | log |X |) time.
Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism Achieving the
Best Possible Bound for Additive Utilities
This subsection provides another stable mechanism for the
proportional markets that does not have a constant stability
bound, but is strategy-proof for doctors. We employ a se-
quential choice function Chh that greedily chooses the con-
tracts according to increasing order of size while keeping the
budget constraint. Formally, we define this as Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5:
input: (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A(Xh) output: Chh(x1, . . . , xk)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort {x1, . . . , xk} according to increasing order of size;
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do
4 let x be the ith smallest contract;
5 if s(Y ) + s(x) ≤ 1 then Y ← Y ∪ {x};
6 return Y ;
Let us first claim that the choice function is sequential.
Since it clearly satisfies (1), let us check (2). W.l.o.g., we
may assume that s(x1) < s(x2) < · · · < s(xk) be-
cause the hospitals’ choices depend not on the order of
the input sequence, but on size. If
∑k
i=1 s(xi) ≤ 1, then
{x1, . . . , xk} \ Chh(x1, . . . , xk) must be empty and hence
(2) holds. Thus, we assume that
∑k
i=1 s(xi) > 1.
Let ℓ be the largest index such that
∑ℓ
i=1 s(xi) ≤ 1. If the
(ℓ+1)st contract is chosen, the budget is exceeded. We then
have Chh(x1, . . . , xk) = {x1, . . . , xℓ} and {x1, . . . , xk} \
Chh(x1, . . . , xk) = {xℓ+1, . . . , xk}. With the (k + 1)st
contract xk+1, if s(xk+1) > s(xℓ+1), (2) holds because
Chh(x1, . . . , xk+1) = {x1, . . . , xℓ}. Otherwise, we have
Chh(x1, . . . , xk+1) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xℓ, xk+1} and hence (2)
holds. Thus, the choice function Chh is sequential. We fur-
ther claim that it satisfies the following properties:
Lemma 5. For each hospital h, the choice function defined
in Algorithm 5 is order-invariant, size-monotone, and 11−s -
approximate.
Proof. First, each choice function is clearly order-invariant
from the definition. We thus assume without loss of gener-
ality that s(x1) < s(x2) < · · · < s(xk) throughout this
proof.
Second, we observe that each choice functionChh is size-
monotone. To see this, it is sufficient to prove
|Chh(x1, . . . , xk)| ≤ |Chh(x1, . . . , xk+1)| (4)
for any sequence of contracts (x1, . . . , xk, xk+1). Recall
that ℓ is the largest index such that the budget is not ex-
ceeded. Then, we have Chh(x1, . . . , xk) = {x1, . . . , xℓ}.
We consider two cases for the (k + 1)st contract xk+1. If
s(xk+1) > s(xℓ), then (4) holds because {x1, . . . , xℓ} ⊆
Chh(x1, . . . , xk+1). Otherwise, (4) also holds because
{x1, . . . , xℓ−1, xk+1} ⊆ Chh(x1, . . . , xk+1). Accordingly,
Chh is size-monotone.
Finally, we show that Chh is
1
1−s -approximate. Let us
assume that the input sequence is x = (x1, . . . , xk). If∑k
i=1 s(xi) ≤ 1, we have Chh(x) = {x1, . . . , xk} and
u(Chh(x)) =
k∑
i=1
s(xi) = max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
X˜ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}
}
.
Otherwise, for the index ℓ, we have
s(Chh(x)) =
ℓ∑
i=1
s(xi) > 1− s(xℓ+1) ≥ 1− s
and hence
u(Chh(x)) = (1− s) ≥ (1− s) ·max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
X˜ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}
}
.
Thus, Chh is
1
1−s -approximate.
Now, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 8. For any proportional market, the generalized
DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algo-
rithm 5 is strategy-proof for doctors and produces a 11−s -
stable matching. In addition, the mechanism can be imple-
mented to run in O(|X | log |X |) time.
Conclusion
This paper examined matching with budget constraints and
introduced a concept of approximately stable matchings.
First, we extended the existing framework and proposed two
novel mechanisms that return a stable matching in polyno-
mial time: one is strategy-proof for doctors and the other
is not. Second, we derived the bounds of the utilities’ incre-
ment by coalitional deviation. The best possible bound is ob-
tained by sacrificing strategy-proofness for additive utilities.
Finally, we examined a case in which hospitals have pro-
portional utilities and found another two mechanisms that
achieve better approximation ratios.
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Omitted proofs
In this section, we provide omitted proofs.
Theorem 1. For any constant α > 1, distinguishing
whether a given market has a 1-stable matching or has no
α-stable matching is NP-complete.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first observe that the problem is in
the class NP. A witness would be a 1-stable matching X ′.
HereX ′ is a 1-stable matching if
u(X ′h) ≥ max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
|X ′d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D),
X˜ ⊆
{
x ∈ Xh : x xD x
′ ∈ X ′xD
}
}
.
Since we only want to distinguish the existence of 1-stable
matching and nonexistence of α-stable matching, it is
sufficient to check
u(X ′h) ≥
1
α
max
{
u(X˜) :
s(X˜) ≤ 1,
|X ′d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D),
X˜ ⊆
{
x ∈ Xh : x xD x
′ ∈ X ′xD
}
}
.
We can check the condition for each h in polynomial
time because we can find α-approximate solution of
max{u(X˜) : s(X˜) ≤ 1, |X˜d| ≤ 1 (∀d ∈ D), X˜ ⊆ {x ∈
Xh : x xD x
′ ∈ X ′xD}} in polynomial time for any fixed
α > 1 (Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004). Thus, the
problem is in the class NP.
We then prove the NP-hardness by reducing the subset
sum problem—given n + 1 positive integers a1, . . . , an, t,
ask whether there exists a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that∑
i∈I ai = t.
Let a1, . . . , an and t be an instance of subset sum prob-
lem and let a =
∑n
j=1 aj . Also, let m = ⌈3α
2⌉. Without
loss of generality, we assume that a > t > 0. Consider the
following market:
• D = {dji : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . ,m},
• H = {h+, h−} ∪ {hji : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . ,m− 1},
• X =
⋃n
i=1
Xi where Xi = {r
i,1, ri,2, ri,3} ∪
{xi,1, . . . , xi,m} ∪ {yi,2, . . . , yi,m} ∪ {zi,1, . . . , zi,m−1},
• ≻d0
i
: ri,1 ≻d0
i
ri,2 ≻d0
i
ri,3 for i = 1, . . . , n,
• ≻d1
i
: xi,1 ≻d1
i
zi,1 for i = 1, . . . , n,
• ≻
d
j
i
: yi,j ≻
d
j
i
xi,j ≻
d
j
i
zi,j for i = 1, . . . , n and j =
2, . . . ,m− 1,
• ≻dm
i
: yi,m ≻dm
i
xi,m for i = 1, . . . , n,
where
ri,1D = d
0
i , r
i,1
H = h
+, u(ri,1) = ait , s(r
i,1) = ait , (i=1,...,n),
ri,2D = d
0
i , r
i,2
H = h
−, u(ri,2) = aia−t , s(r
i,2) = aia−t , (i=1,...,n),
ri,3D = d
0
i , r
i,3
H = h
0
i u(r
i,3) = 1, s(ri,3) = 1, (i=1,...,n),
xi,jD = d
j
i , x
i,j
H = h
0
i , u(x
i,j) = 2αm , s(x
i,j) = 1m , (
i=1,...,n,
j=1,...,m),
yi,jD = d
j
i , y
i,j
H = h
j−1
i , u(y
i,j) = 1, s(yi,j) = 1 (i=1,...,n,j=2,...,m),
zi,jD = d
j
i , z
i,j
H = h
j
i , u(z
i,j) = 2α, s(zi,j) = 1 ( i=1,...,n,j=1,...,m−1).
We claim that there exists a 1-stable matching if the subset
sum instance is yes-instance and there exists no α-stable
matching otherwise.
First, suppose that the subset sum instance is yes-instance.
Let I∗ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈I ai = t. Then, we ob-
serve that
X ′ :=
⋃
i∈I∗
{ri,1} ∪
⋃
i6∈I∗
{ri,2} ∪
n⋃
i=1
{xi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,m}
is a 1-stable matching. Since every doctor dji (i =
1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m) matches with the best contract,
it is sufficient to consider coalitions that contain some ri.
Let X ′′ = {ri : i ∈ I} for a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then,
u(X ′′) =
∑
i∈I ai ≤ t−1 and henceX
′′ is not a 1-blocking
coalition. Thus,X ′ is a 1-stable matching.
Next, we claim that X ′ is not α-stable if a matching X ′
satisfies X ′ ∩ {ri
∗,1, ri
∗,2} = ∅ for some i∗. Note that, if
the subset sum instance is no-instance, there exists such an
index i∗ for any matching X ′. Let us assume that X ′ is an
α-stable matching. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: ri
∗,3 ∈ X ′. In this case, d1i∗ is assigned to h
1
i∗ ,
i.e., zi
∗,1 ∈ X ′ and yi
∗,2 6∈ X ′, because u(zi
∗,1) = 2α ·
u(yi
∗,2) > α · u(yi
∗,2). By applying induction, we obtain
that zi
∗,1, . . . , zi
∗,m−1 ∈ X ′ and yi
∗,2, . . . , yi
∗,m 6∈ X ′.
Thus, {xi
∗,1, . . . , xi
∗,m} is an α-blocking coalition for h0i ,
a contradiction.
Case 2: ri
∗,3 6∈ X ′. In this case, each hospital hj−1i∗
(j = 2, . . . ,m) is assigned a contract since otherwise
{yji∗} is an α-blocking coalition for h
j−1
i∗ . Thus, we have
|X ′ ∩ {xi
∗,1, . . . , xi
∗,m}| ≤ 1. This implies that u(X ′
h0
i∗
) ≤
2α/m < 1/α and hence {ri
∗,3} is an α-blocking coalition
for h0i∗ . This contradicts our assumption.
Thus, there exists no α-stable matching if the subset sum
instance is no-instance.
Theorem 2. For any positive reals 1/2 < s < 1 and ǫ,
there exists a market such that s(x) ≤ s for all x and no(
1
1−s − ǫ
)
-stable matching exists.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let δ be a sufficiently small positive
real and α = 1/(1 − s). Let n = ⌊1/δ3⌋, m = ⌈1/s⌉,
and l = ⌊(1− s)/δ⌋+ 1.
Consider a market with n + 1 doctors
D = {d∗, d1, . . . , dn} and n − l + 1 hospitals
H = {h∗, hl+1, . . . , hn}. The set of contracts is
X = {x∗, x1, . . . , xn} ∪ {yi,j : i = 1, . . . , n, j =
max{i, l+ 1}, . . . , n} where
x∗D = d
∗, x∗H = h
∗, u(x) = s, s(x) = s,
xiD = di, x
i
H = h
∗, u(xi) = i · δ3, s(xi) = δ (i = 1, . . . , n),
yi,jD = di, y
i,j
H = hj , u(y
i,j) = α−i, s(yi,j) = s ( i=1,...,n,j=max{i,l+1},...,n),
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
≻d0: x
∗,
≻di: x
i ≻di y
i,l+1 ≻di · · · ≻di y
i,n (i = 1, . . . , l)
≻di: y
i,i ≻di x
i ≻di y
i,i+1 ≻di · · · ≻di y
i,n (i = l+ 1, . . . , n).
We claim that there exists no (α− ǫ)-stable matching in
this market by contradiction. Let us assume that X ′ is an
(α− ǫ)-stable matching. Here, each hospital hi (i = l +
1, . . . , n) is assigned a contract since otherwise {yi,i} is an
(α− ǫ)-blocking coalition for hi.
First, let us consider a case where x∗ ∈ X ′. In this case, at
least one of doctors in {d1, . . . , dl} is not assigned to h
∗, i.e.,
{x1, . . . , xl} 6⊆ X ′, because s(x∗) +
∑l
i=1 s(x
i) > 1. Let
i1 be the smallest index i such that x
i 6∈ X ′. Then, we have
yi1,l+1 ∈ X ′ and yl+1,l+1 6∈ X ′ since otherwise {yi1,l+1}
is an α-blocking coalition for hl+1. Similarly, at least one of
doctors in {d1, . . . , dl+1} \ {di1} is not assigned to h
∗. Let
i2 be the second smallest index i such that x
i 6∈ X ′. Then,
we have yi2,l+2 ∈ X ′ and yl+2,l+2 6∈ X ′ since otherwise
{yi2,l+1} is an α-blocking coalition for hl+2. By applying
induction, we obtain that yi,i 6∈ X ′ for i = l+1, . . . , n. Now
we show that X1 := {xn−⌊1/δ⌋+1, . . . , xn} is an (α− ǫ)-
blocking coalition for h∗. By the above discussion, x ≻xD
x′ holds for any x ∈ X1 \ X ′ and x′ ∈ X ′xD . Hence, it is
sufficient to prove that u(X1) > (α− ǫ) ·u(X ′h∗). A simple
computation gives that
u(X ′h∗) ≤ s+
n∑
i=n−l+2
i · δ3
≤ s+ (l − 1)n · δ3 ≤ 1 + (1 − s)(1/δ),
and
u(X1) =
n∑
i=n−⌊1/δ⌋+1
i · δ3
≥ (n− ⌊1/δ⌋+ 1) · ⌊1/δ⌋ · δ3 ≥ (1− δ2)⌊1/δ⌋
since s(X1) = δ · ⌊1/δ⌋ ≤ 1. Thus, we obtain
u(X1)
u(X ′h∗)
≥
(1− δ2)⌊1/δ⌋
1 + (1 − s)(1/δ)
→
1
1− s
= α
as δ goes to 0. Hence, X1 is an (α− ǫ)-blocking coalition
for h∗ since δ is sufficiently small.
Next, let us consider the other case, i.e. x∗ 6∈ X ′. Since
each hospital hi (i = l+1, . . . , n) is assigned a contract, we
have |X ′∩{x1, . . . , xn}| ≤ l. Also, |X ′∩{x1, . . . , xn}| ≥ 1
since otherwise {x∗} is a (α − ǫ)-blocking coalition. Let
i∗ be the largest index i such that xi ∈ X ′. Then we have
u(X ′h∗) ≤ l · i
∗ · δ3 ≤ i∗ · ((1 − s)δ2 + δ3).
For the case i∗ ≤ s/δ2, let X2 = {x∗}. Then we get
u(X2)
u(X ′h∗)
≥
s
i∗ · ((1− s)δ2 + δ3)
≥
1
(1 − s) + δ
→ α
as δ goes to 0. Hence, X2 is an (α− ǫ)-blocking coalition
for h∗ when δ is sufficiently small.
For the case i∗ > s/δ2, letX3 = {xi
∗−⌊1/δ⌋+1, . . . , xi
∗
}.
Here, i∗ > l holds since δ is sufficiently small. We show
that X3 is an (α− ǫ)-blocking coalition for h∗ in this case.
Since |X ′ ∩ {x1, . . . , xn}| ≤ l and xi
∗
∈ X ′, at least
one of doctors in {d1, . . . , dl} is not assigned to h∗, i.e.,
{x1, . . . , xl} 6⊆ X ′. Analysis similar to that in the first case
shows that yi,i 6∈ X ′ for i = l + 1, . . . , i∗. Then, we have
x ≻xD x
′ holds for any x ∈ X3 \X ′ and x′ ∈ X ′xD . Also
we have
u(X3)
u(X ′h∗)
≥
∑i∗
i=i∗−⌊1/δ⌋+1 i · δ
3
i∗ · ((1 − s)δ2 + δ3)
≥
(i∗ − ⌊1/δ⌋) · δ2
i∗ · ((1 − s)δ2 + δ3)
≥
δ2
(1 − s)δ2 + δ3
−
(⌊1/δ⌋) · δ2
(s/δ2) · ((1− s)δ2 + δ3)
→ α
as δ goes to 0. Hence, X3 is an (α− ǫ)-blocking coalition
for h∗ when δ is sufficiently small.
Proposition 1. For 1 ≥ s > 1/2, there exists a market such
that the generalized DA with the choice functions defined in
Algorithm 2 is not strategy-proof for doctors.
Proof. Let us consider the following market:
• D = {d1, d2, d3}, H = {h1, h2}, X =
{x1,1, x1,2, x2,1, x2,2, x3,1, x3,2},
• xi,jD = di and x
i,j
H = hj (i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2),
• s(x1,1) = s(x3,1) = 1/2, s(x1,2) = s(x2,1) = s(x2,2) =
s(x3,2) = s,
• u(x1,1) = 1, u(x1,2) = 4, u(x2,1) = 4, u(x2,2) =
1, u(x3,1) = 2, u(x3,2) = 2,
• x1,1 ≻d1 x
1,2, x2,2 ≻d2 x
2,1, x3,2 ≻d3 x
3,1.
For this market, the generalized DA outputs a matching
{x1,2, x3,1}. However, if d3 misreports her preference as
x2,1 ≻′d3 x
2,2, then the generalized DA gives a matching
{x1,2, x2,1, x3,1}. Thus, the mechanism is not strategy-proof
for doctors since d2 has an incentive to misreport.
Theorem 9. For any sciently small ǫ > 0, distinguish-
ing whether a given proportional market has
(
1+
√
5
2 − ǫ
)
-
stable matching or not is NP-hard.
Proof. Recall that φ = 1+
√
5
2 .
We prove the NP-hardness by reducing the subset sum
problem. Let a1, . . . , an and t be an instance of subset sum
problem and let a =
∑n
j=1 aj . Without loss of generality,
we assume that a > t > 0.
Consider a market with n + 3 doctors D =
{d1, . . . , dn+2} and four hospitals H = {h1, . . . , h4}. The
set of constracts isX =
⋃n
i=1{x
i,1, xi,2, xi,3} ∪ {y, yˆ, z, zˆ}
where
xi,1D = di, xH = h1, s(x
i,1) = ai/t, (i = 1, . . . , n),
xi,2D = di, xH = h2, s(x
i,2) = ai/(a− t), (i = 1, . . . , n),
xi,3D = di, xH = h3, s(x
i,3) = 1/φ+ ǫ/2, (i = 1, . . . , n),
yD = dn+1, yH = h3, s(y) = (1/φ)
2,
yˆD = dn+1, yˆH = h4, s(yˆ) = 1,
zD = dn+2, zH = h3, s(z) = 1/φ,
zˆD = dn+2, zˆH = h4, s(zˆ) = ǫ.
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
≻di: x
i,1 ≻di x
i,2 ≻di x
i,3, (i = 1, . . . , n),
≻dn+1: y ≻dn+1 yˆ,
≻dn+2: zˆ ≻dn+2 z.
We claim that there exists a 1-stable matching if the subset
sum instance is yes-instance and there exists no (φ − ǫ)-
stable matching otherwise.
Suppose that the subset sum instance is yes-instance. Let
I∗ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈I ai = t. Then, we can ob-
serve that
X ′′ := {xi,1 : i ∈ I∗} ∪ {xi,2 : i 6∈ I∗} ∪ {y, zˆ}
is a 1-stable matching.
Conversely, suppose that the subset sum instance is no-
instance. We claim that there exists no (φ− ǫ)-stable match-
ing by contradiciton. Let us assume that X ′′ is an (φ −
ǫ)-stable matching. Since the subset sum instance is no-
instance, there exists an index i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
X ′′ ∩ {xi
∗,1, xi
∗,2} = ∅. Then, by a similar discussion to
the proof of Theorem 6,X ′′ is not (φ− ǫ)-stable, which is a
contradiction.
